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INTRODUCTION
Host Governments commonly retain ownership of oil and gas
resources1 with the United States and Canada being the few exceptions to
this rule.2 Regardless of the public or private nature of ownership of oil
and gas resources, their exploration and production are both a risky and
expensive business. Therefore, Host Governments and private owners tend
to delegate the exploratory and exploitation rights to a third party with
technical and financial resources to undertake such an endeavor. This
delegation of powers is commonly given via a granting instrument, which
assigns all, part, or none of the ownership and their exclusive rights of the
oil and gas resources. In other words, the granting instrument is the
“vehicle in which the state’s interests in a petroleum deposit is conveyed
to the private sector so that the petroleum deposit can thereby be
developed.”3 
1. BERNARD TAVERNE, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE REGULATION OF THE 
PETROLEUM INDUSTRY: LAWS, CONTRACTS, AND CONVENTIONS 11 (Graham &
Trotman eds., 1994).
2. Id. at 11. NADINE BRET-ROUZAUT & JEAN-PIERRE FAVENNEC, OIL AND 
GAS EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION, RESERVES, COSTS, CONTRACTS 171 
(Technip Editions, 3d. ed. 2011).
3. PETER ROBERTS, PETROLEUMCONTRACTS: ENGLISH LAW AND PRACTICE
38 (Oxford Univ. Press ed., 2013).
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972019] PETROLEUM, CONCESSIONS, LICENSES AND LEASES
The granting instruments take one of the following forms: concession
agreement, production sharing agreement,4 service agreement,5 or a
combination of them.6 This Article does not analyze all of the different types
of granting instruments, but focuses on those encompassed by the so-called
“tax regime,” which are: concession, license, and lease types of granting
instruments. Although these instruments are used interchangeably,7 they
have different connotations, reputations, and implications. 
An integrated assessment of granting instruments is needed given the
importance of foreign investments in all areas of the economy, including
oil and gas. An estimation by the International Energy Agency (IEA)
regarding the investments needed to maintain the current energy supply of
oil and gas reaches a staggering $11.8 trillion to be spent until 2030.8 Many 
of these investments would go into upstream activities, at the basis of
which lie granting instruments.9 Despite the need for consistent
investment, there is a significant number of obstacles. These include: (1)
overproduction resulting in a decrease of price; (2) the desire of producing
countries to exploit their national resources on their own; (3) the pressure
4. Virginia Haufler, The Natural Resources Trap: Private Investment
Without Public Commitment, 29 REV. POLICY RESEARCH 315 (2012).
5. Id. at 316.
6. See ANTHONY JENNINGS, OIL AND GAS EXPLORATION CONTRACTS
(Sweet & Maxwell 2d ed. 2008); TAVERNE, supra note 1; BERNARD. G. TAVERNE,
CO-OPERATIVE AGREEMENTS IN THE EXTRACTIVE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY
(Kluwer Law Int’l 1996); BERNARD G. TAVERNE, PETROLEUM, INDUSTRY AND
GOVERNMENTS: A STUDY OF THE INVOLVEMENT OF INDUSTRY AND 
GOVERNMENTS IN THE PRODUCTION AND USE OF PETROLEUM (Kluwer Law Int’l
2d ed. 2008); CHRIS THORPE, FUNDAMENTALS OF UPSTREAM PETROLEUM
AGREEMENTS (2009); JOINT VENTURES & SHAREHOLDER´S AGREEMENTS (Chris
Wilkinson et al eds., 3d ed. 2009); CLAUDE DUVAL ET AL., INTERNATIONAL
PETROLEUM AND EXPLORATION AGREEMENTS: LEGAL, ECONOMIC & POLICY 
ASPECTS (2d ed. 2009); ERNEST E. SMITH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM
TRANSACTIONS (3d ed. 2010); TERENCE DAINTITH ET AL., UNITED KINGDOM OIL
& GAS LAW (Sweet & Maxwell 3d ed. 2009).
7. MARC HAMMERSON, UPSTREAM OIL AND GAS: CASES, MATERIALS, AND 
COMMENTARY 48 (Globe Law and Business 2011). Hammerson also mentions
dissenting opinions arguing that production sharing agreements cannot be
described, even loosely, as concessions, and fall into the category of commercial
contracts.
8. FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE ENERGY SECTOR: BALANCING PRIVATE
AND PUBLIC INTERESTS 9–10 (Eric De Brabandere & Tarcisio Gazzini eds., 2014)
(citing an IEA World Energy Outlook from 2008) [hereinafter FOREIGN
INVESTMENT].
9. Id.
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98 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
placed on the governments to address environmental or national security
concerns; (4) the lack of a global policy framework; (5) civil resistance
and local activism against foreign investment or oil field development; and
(6) an increased difficulty in gaining access to resources.10 
Obstacles are generated by an apparent conflict between the interests
of parties involved in the granting instrument, or better put, between the
market (private) values and the state (public) values. Because oil and gas
projects are both expensive and risky,11 investors seek clarity, stability,
and certainty to protect their investment and to guarantee the recovery of
capital and profitability of the project. Host countries were initially
concerned with their revenues and taxes, but nowadays exhibit more of an
interest to increase control over their resources and retain their right to
regulate. Finally, other stakeholders, such as the local population or
community, indigenous groups, and environmentalists, gained 
momentum. The issues of environmental protection, energy efficiency,
preservation of local communities, human rights, corruption, or other
aspects of corporate social responsibility add to the list of parties’
expectations and further complicate an already complicated framework.12 
The biggest challenge, however, remains the balancing of the
conflicting interests and values13 in a manner that would not deter
investors from getting involved, would not deprive the state of its
sovereign rights, and would ensure that the societal benefits from the
exploitation of its national resources in a transparent manner.14 Oil and gas
history reveals a continuous struggle toward a more equitable distribution
of benefits. Several host nations have modified or expropriated several
10. Id. at 13–14.
11. There are three main types of risks associated with oil and gas projects. 
First is the discovery risk, for the existence, size, and quality of the oil field are
very hard to anticipate. Second is the economic risk, for drilling costs depend on
the field's characteristics and not any deposit is commercially viable. Third, there
is a political/sovereign risk, stemming from the fact that state own their petroleum
reserves and their right to expropriate foreign investors is recognized
internationally. Haufler, supra note 4, at 51.
12. FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra note 8, at 21, 23.
13. Kim Talus, Scott Looper & Steven Otillar, Lex Petrolea and the
Internationalization of Petroleum Agreements: Focus on Host Government 
Contracts 5 J. WORLD ENERGY L. & BUS. 181, 185 (2012).
14. It must be emphasized here that the issue of managing and using the
generated revenues do not involve the investor as much as the other above-
mentioned issues. Regarding this particular matter, the investor is a part of the
equation where the society and the state require a higher level of revenues and
commitments (e.g., corporate and social responsibility).
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992019] PETROLEUM, CONCESSIONS, LICENSES AND LEASES
host-granting instruments throughout time.15 Some countries moved from
one type of host granting instrument to another, which serves as a strong
indication of how difficult it is—if not impossible—to strike a balance.
Almost a century after the extensive use of granting agreements in the oil
and gas sector, they are still perceived as controversial, inequitable, and
unfair.16 
The main questions addressed are the following: (1) Is there any
difference between a concession agreement, a license, and a lease?; (2) 
What is their legal nature?; (3) What is the interplay between public and
private law regarding these granting instruments?; (4) Do the differences
between granting instruments matter?; and (5) What are the implications
for the parties? 
To answer these questions, this Article takes both a comparative and
cross-jurisdictional approach to analyzing granting instruments. The
comparison is conducted between all three granting instruments and serves
to achieve the goal of identifying their legal nature and the implications
stemming therefrom. The cross-jurisdictional data is needed to determine
whether any of the granting instruments are specific or determined by the
legal family or legal system. Where deemed necessary, references to case
law, arbitral awards, or specific normative provisions are made. 
While petroleum experts may be familiar with granting instruments
individual characteristics, the novelty and value of this Article lies with 
the integrated comparison and its focus on the public versus private law
divide encompassed by the chosen granting instruments. Although this is
a legal article, it targets a wider audience. On one hand, it offers a concise
and structured overview of all challenges posed by the granting
instruments’ legal nature, making this Article a valuable tool not only for
professionals, but also for those wishing to familiarize themselves with the
intricacies of petroleum contracts. On the other hand, this Article’s trans-
national coverage makes it relevant beyond the limits set by particular
national laws.
This Article is divided into four parts. Part I presents the key
definitions and characteristics of these granting instruments. Part II
addresses the legal nature of the three granting instruments from both a
national and an international perspective. Part III discusses the similarities,
15. For instance, the Soviet Union nationalized the oil production in 1918,
Bolivia in 1937, Mexico in 1938, Iran in 1951, Brazil in 1953, and Iraq in 1961.
See DANIEL YERGIN, THE PRIZE: THE EPIC QUEST FOR OIL, MONEY, AND POWER, 
(Simon & Schuster UK Ltd., 4th ed., 2012).  
16. Russia’s refusal to sign the Energy Charter Treaty was motivated by the
treaty’s bias towards consumer countries. KIM TALUS, EU ENERGY LAW AND 
POLICY,ACRITICALACCOUNT 454 (Kim Talus ed., Oxford University Press 2013).
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100 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
distinctions, and implications stemming from the legal nature of the
chosen granting instruments. Part IV closes with key findings and 
concluding remarks. 
I. DEFINING GRANTING INSTRUMENTS
Before this Article embarks on the analysis of the legal nature of the
three chosen granting instruments and delves into the legal implications
stemming out of them, it is useful to first define and identify the
characteristics of each instrument.
A. Petroleum Concessions
The petroleum concession is an agreement that grants title of the oil
and gas resources (which may include reserves) to the International Oil
Company (IOC) that develops these resources. Historically, the agreement
conferred exclusive rights within large areas for long periods of time in
exchange for a mere obligation to pay some smaller bonuses, annual sums,
or royalties. Otherwise, the concession holders were exempted from any
taxes or duties, including income and profit taxes.17 One famous example 
is the concession granted in 1901 by the Persian government to William
D’Arcy (the D’Arcy Concession). This concession granted its holder the
exclusive right to explore and develop the entire country (excluding five
territories) for a term of 60 years, and it did not impose any tax liability
towards the Persian government.18 Other concessions in countries of the
Middle East, such as Iraq,19 Saudi Arabia,20 or Kuwait,21 were similarly 
long and disproportionate. 
The environment created by the first petroleum concessions is no
longer in existence. Many nation-states that entered into the traditional
17. TAVERNE, supra note 1, at 33. For instance, the D’Arcy concession
established revenues of 16% as a “quid pro quo for complete fiscal exemption.”
See ZUHAYR MIKDASHI, A FINANCIAL ANALYSIS OF MIDDLE EASTERN OIL
CONCESSIONS, 1901-65, at 12–14 (F. A. Praeger 1966). The 1925 Iraqi
Concession agreement also contained a complete fiscal exemption. See id. at 67. 
The worst situation appears to have been in Kuwait, where the royalty payments
were lower than in all neighboring countries, doubled by a complete lack of
guarantees. See id. at 82–83; see also TAVERNE, supra note 1, at 41.
18. TAVERNE, supra note 1, at 34. See also CAMERON PETER, PROPERTY 
RIGHTS AND SOVEREIGN RIGHTS: THE CASE OF NORTH SEA OIL 11–12 (New
York, Academic Press Inc. 1983).
19. MIKDASHI, supra note 17, at 105.
20. Id. at 80.
21. TAVERNE, supra note 1, at 36.
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2019] PETROLEUM, CONCESSIONS, LICENSES AND LEASES 101
type of concessions have removed the old system and replaced it with one
that is more favorable to the host nation. Many social, environmental,
economic, and political pressures have forced new versions of concessions
along with new types of granting instruments that better serve the purposes
of individuals and governments alike.22 In fact, the abandonment of the old
concession system is a product of many developing nation-states asserting
their sovereignty and increasing sophisticated political systems.23 
Nevertheless, producing countries such as Brazil,24 Argentina,25 and
Morocco26 still use and offer a modernized format of concession systems. 
In addition, it is important to mention the classification of concession
agreements. The literature identifies two theories concerned with
determining the legal nature of concession agreements, which will be
developed upon in the following section. On one hand, concession
agreements are perceived as contracts,which confers upon them a binding
character (historical Middle East concessions),27 meaning unilateral
change or termination entitles the aggrieved party to obtain
compensation.28 This interpretation is in Saudi Arabia v. Arabian 
American Oil (Aramco)29 and Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. v. Libya.30 
In both cases, the arbitrators held that the concessions were more than
mere administrative acts subject to the whims of the state. On the other
hand, the concessions are perceived as hybrid forms—such as 
administrative contracts, governed by a special set of rules, addressing and
22. Id. at 42–48.
23. Id. at 34–35.
24. EDUARDO G. PEREIRA, BRAZILIAN UPSTREAMOIL AND GAS: A PRACTICAL
GUIDE TO THE LAW AND REGULATION (Globe Law and Business 2016).
25. EDUARDO G. PEREIRA&FERNANDO FRESCO,LATIN AMERICAN UPSTREAM
OIL AND GAS:APRACTICALGUIDE TO THE LAW AND REGULATION (Globe Law and 
Business 2015).
26. EDUARDO G. PEREIRA&KIM TALUS, AFRICANUPSTREAMOIL AND GAS: A
PRACTICALGUIDE TO THELAW AND REGULATION (Globe Law and Business 2015).
27. TERENCE DAINTITH, THE LEGAL CHARACTER OF PETROLEUM LICENCES:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY 223 (University of Dundee, Centre for Petroleum and
Mineral Law Studies 1981).
28. When historical concessions were entered in the Middle East, there were 
neither petroleum, nor tax legislations in place. The legal framework governing
operations was limited to the concession agreement itself. These agreements were
of obvious contractual nature.
29. See 27 INTERNATIONAL LAWREPORT 117 (Elihu Lauterpracht ed., 1963).
30. See 53 INTERNATIONAL LAWREPORT 389 (Elihu Lauterpracht ed., 1977).
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102 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
imposing limits to the pressing issue of unilateral change, without banning
it altogether (France, Germany, Brazil, and to a certain extent, Romania).31 
The administrative contract, a creation of French law, is subject to the
regulatory power of the state and, therefore, allows for modification of the
contract pursuant to the state's regulatory powers that would not be 
allowed between purely private parties.32 A further interaction between the
public and private nature of concessions occurs in certain legal systems,
which either require parliamentary approval of the concession, by a
specific law or are considering such requirements for their legal system
(e.g., Ghana, Tunisia, Iran, and Azerbaijan).33 In this sense, the concession
might become legislation itself and part of the legal system.34 
B. Petroleum Licenses
Petroleum licenses tend to be administrative/regulatory acts granted
by the state. This makes them subject to unilateral change, which is a
31. VIBE ULFBECK, RESPONSIBILITIES AND LIABILITIES FOR COMMERCIAL
ACTIVITY IN THE ARCTIC, THE EXAMPLE OF GREENLAND, 33–34 (Vibe Ulfbeck,
Anders Møllmann & Bent Ole Gram Mortensen eds., Routledge 2016). For details 
concerning the importance of determining whether the license is a contract or a 
regulatory act, see HAMMERSON, supra note 7, at 62–63.
32. SeeHENRY CATTAN, THELAW OFOIL CONCESSIONS IN THE MIDDLEEAST
AND NORTH AFRICA (Willis L. M. Reese, Foreign Parker School of and Law
Comparative eds, 1967).
33. See Wissem Heni & Amir Shafaie, Tunisia’a Draft Law on 
Parliamentary Approval of Oil Contracts: Miss Transparency Opportunity?,
RESOURCE GOVERNANCE (Mar. 15, 2017), https://resourcegovernance.org/blog
/tunisia%E2%80%99s-draft-law-parliamentary-approval-oil-contracts-missed-
transparency-opportunity [https://perma.cc/2MLQ-T6PU]; Gilbert Ankrah &
Richie Osei Asiedu, Ghana: Parliament to Approve Petroleum Exploration
Contract Between Ghana and AGM Petroleum, ALL AFRICA (Nov. 29, 2013),
https://allafrica.com/stories/201312020636.html [https://perma.cc/2GU4-5F97]; 
Alireza Ramezani, Iran Closer to Rolling Out New Oil Project Contracts, AL-
MONITOR (Aug. 24, 2016), https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/08
/iran-petroleum-contract-ipc-final-confirmation-parliament.html [https://perma.c
c/K9M4-VZEH]; Nermin Rehimova, Azerbaijan Parliament Ratifies Agreements
on “Umid-Babek” Block, AZ REP. NEWS AGENCY (May 2, 2017, 4:36 PM),
https://report.az/en/energy/azerbaijan-parliament-ratified-agreements-on-umid-
babek-block/ [https://perma.cc/2Y85-DA9D].
34. See sources cited supra note 33.
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1032019] PETROLEUM, CONCESSIONS, LICENSES AND LEASES
position largely adopted by Western developed countries, such as the
United Kingdom,35 Denmark,36 Norway,37 and Australia.38 
There is no written history of licenses, but in the United Kingdom39 
and Australia, the system was implemented because early efforts to
develop onshore deposits were obstructed by landowners who claimed that
ownership of minerals followed ownership of the land. This situation still
exists in the United States and Canada, as this Article discusses in the
following subsection. In the United Kingdom, the government decided to
ignore the issue of ownership (onshore at that time) and retained the right
to prevent any operations without a license. Such uncertainty might have
prevented further oil and gas developments. However, by the introduction
of the Petroleum (Production) Act of 1934 (Great Britain) and 1923
(Queensland, Australia), the ownership of mineral resources in situ was 
vested in the Crown and ended any uncertainty about this matter.40 A 
similar development occurred in Norway,41 although it is more recent.
Thus, the origin of licenses must be sought in the desire of the national
35. For instance, in 1975, the legislator in the UK decided to amend all
licenses’ terms by new legislation, namely the Oil Taxation Act of 1975. Today
each license is controlled by Model Clauses under which the license was granted,
unless the new Model Clauses expressly apply retroactively. Greg Gordon & John
Paterson, Licensing the Exploration for and Production of Petroleum on the UK
Continental Shelf, in REGULATION OF THE UPSTREAM PETROLEUM SECTOR: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LICENSING AND CONCESSION SYSTEMS 111 (Tina
Hunter ed., 2015). See Hunter, infra note 38.
36. MARTHA M. ROGGENKAMP, ENERGY LAW IN EUROPE, NATIONAL, EU
AND INTERNATIONAL REGULATION 419 (Martha M. Roggenkamp, Catherine
Redgwell & Iñigo del Guayo eds., 3rd ed. 2016).
37. TAVERNE supra note 1, at 58–59.
38. Tina Hunter, Licensing and Concession System for Developing
Australia’s Conventional Petroleum Resources, in REGULATION OF THE
UPSTREAM PETROLEUM SECTOR: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LICENSING AND
CONCESSION SYSTEMs 84 (Tina Hunter ed., 2015).
39. See id. at 109. See also DAINTITH supra note 27, at 201–02: “The
petroleum license . . . has had two quite different characters in the United
Kingdom: that of a pure instrument of public regulation and that of a grant of
public property.”
40. Hunter, supra note 38, at 82–83. Gordon & Paterson, supra note 35, at 
108–09.
41. TAVERNE, supra note 1, at 61.
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104 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
government to assert and maintain control42 over their mineral resources
in order to develop the sector.43 
The petroleum license, like any other granting instrument, is a
connection between the State’s rights in petroleum resources and a
company wishing to exploit those resources. In effect, a license is an
administrative permission to take actions as allowed by that license,
although its legal nature is not clear. British scholars, namely Greg Gordon
and John Paterson, refer to the licensing process as being partly regulatory,
partly contractual. Norwegian authors, such as Nordtveit, compare it with
individual concessions.44 The petroleum license is contractual in form
because parties sign it and consideration is given.45 However, it is also
regulatory in effect because the object and the methods of transfer are
governed by statute. The petroleum license also imposes obligations
mainly on the licensee and confers powers on the relevant government.46 
C. Petroleum Leases
Originally, land ownership covered both the surface and subsurface.
Thus, any hydrocarbons would belong to the owner of the land by
42. Id. at 58.
43. “The licensing and concession system has been developed by many states 
to interact with and govern the conduct of participating oil companies, and to
maximize financial gains.” Tina Hunter, Comparison of Access to Petroleum in
Developed and Developing Licensing and Concession Systems, in REGULATION
OF THE UPSTREAM PETROLEUM SECTOR: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LICENSING
AND CONCESSION SYSTEMS 395 (Tina Hunter ed., 2015).
44. Gordon & Paterson, supra note 35, at 111. Ernst Nordtveit, Regulation of
the Norwegian Upstream Sector, in REGULATION OF THE UPSTREAM PETROLEUM
SECTOR: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LICENSING AND CONCESSION SYSTEMS 143,
n.33 (Tina Hunter ed., 2015). Nordtveit ventures to affirm that in his opinion there 
is no difference between licenses and concession, which this article deems to be
a consequence of the blurred lines between the analyzed instruments.
45. Gordon & Paterson, supra note 35, at 111. The contractual form of the
license bears important legal consequences. The model form in force at the time 
the license is granted will govern the relationship between the state and the
licensee. However, while in the United Kingdom, it will be (almost) impossible 
to change by the former without the approval of the latter or recourse to retroactive
legislation, while in Norway, conditions will change and new terms will be 
imposed whenever the Parliament so desires, which means the license will not
provide any guarantee of stability of terms. TAVERNE, supra note 1, at 58. Such
differences between the legal regime applicable to the same granting instrument
can only stem from the unclarified legal nature of the license.
46. Gordon & Paterson, supra note 35, at 111.
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1052019] PETROLEUM, CONCESSIONS, LICENSES AND LEASES
accession. Yet, with regard to petroleum resources, this system is mostly
applied in the United States and Canada to private land (excluding federal
or state-owned lands); thus, the owner of the land is able to grant leases to
any person they choose, typically in return for royalty payments.47 Even 
so, the right of ownership is curved by the interest of the state to guarantee
the security and preservation of mineral resources.48 Therefore, the legal
relationship between landowners and oil and gas companies is normally
based on leases, with various terms across various jurisdictions, but with
a similar purpose. 
Compared to the license and concession systems, the petroleum lease
is a system characterized by minimalist intervention from the state in the
development of petroleum resources. Private companies are provided a
large amount of autonomy in conducting their operations, while contract
law provides for matters related to landowners’ rights. However, public
leases provide for less flexibility as several regulations apply in such a
case. Simply stated, in the United States, petroleum leases on state and
federal lands are implemented by regulation so they can look different than
the private leases, which are drafted based on custom, historical practice,
and contractual freedom.49 
It is also important to note that Canada and the United States belong
to the Common Law tradition, with the exceptions of the regional
jurisdictions of Quebec and Louisiana. Nevertheless, a petroleum lease 
would not fit within the Common Law definition of a property lease. A
property lease contemplates the U.S. property for a fee or “rent,” requiring
the lessee to return the property in virtually the same condition. This is not
the case for petroleum leases because the lessee must sever minerals from
the property permanently in order to gain value from the lease.
The legal nature of the oil and gas lease is unclear. Most courts treat it
as both a conveyance and a contract. A lease is a conveyance because the
mineral owner conveys a property right to an oil and gas company to
explore for and produce oil and gas retaining a royalty interest in the
production. This view is apparent in Canada, where the petroleum lease is
47. BRET-ROUZAUT & FAVENNEC, supra note 2, at 171; MUHAMMED
MAZEEL, PETROLEUM FISCAL SYSTEMS AND CONTRACTS 8 (Diplomica Verlag
ed., 2010).
48. BRET-ROUZAT & FAVENNEC, supra note 2, at 171.
49. Kirstin E. Gibbs, Felipe Alice, Giovanna M. Cinelli, Christopher J.
McAuliffe & John Crespo, Oil and Gas Exploration and Production Law in the
United States LEXOLOGY (Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.lexology.com/library/
detail.aspx?g=3bb5950e-2259-43cd-9b3e-585e7b44ace4 [https://perma.cc/DM3
4-BLS].
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106 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
referred to as a profit à prendre,50 and in the American states of Kansas, 
Montana, California, Wyoming, and Oklahoma.51 At the same time, it is a
contract because the oil and gas lessee undertakes the right to explore and
produce under certain express and implied promises.52 For instance, in the
state of Louisiana, a petroleum lease is merely a contract pursuant to the
Mineral Code.53 There are also views whereby the lease creates a “fee
simple determinable estate”54 interest, such as in Texas. This is because
the lease contains a clause that allows the interest to continue indefinitely
“as long as there is production” and, therefore, a royalty.55 
Another peculiarity is that petroleum leases must be authenticated.
The lessor's signature must be acknowledged, either before a notary public
or with witnesses, and recorded in the public registry for real property in
the relevant county, which leads some scholars to advance the idea that the
lease is also a “deed.”56 In addition, while in many states consideration is 
not a prerequisite for the grant of the lease, lessors do receive a bonus upon
execution of the lease.57 These characteristics bring the lease closer to the 
concessions and licenses.
Establishing the nature of the lessee's interest is of particular
importance because it will further determine the nature and extent of the
lessee's rights. A profit a prendre or a license is incorporeal and
nonpossessory. The interest may be abandoned and is not subject to the
possessory remedies of trespass and ejectment. Moreover, nonpossessory
actions must protect the lessee’s interest. Conversely, a “fee simple estate”
is corporeal and possessory, for this reason common law rules on
abandonment or decommissioning do not apply, but the possessory
remedies of trespass and ejectment are available. Additional distinctions
arise from the application of statutory provisions regarding taxation,
50. A profit à prendre is a right vested in one person entering upon another's
land and taking a profit therefrom. See Berkheiser v. Berkheiser [1957] S.C.R.
387 (Can.); 7 D.L.R. 2d 721.
51. JOHN S. LOWE, OIL AND GAS LAW IN A NUTSHELL 187 (West Academic,
6th ed. 2014).
52. JOHN S. LOWE ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON OIL AND GAS LAW 307 
(West Academic, 6th ed. 2012).
53. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:114 (2018).
54. LOWE ET AL., supra note 52, at 309.
55. Id. 
56. LOWE, supra note 51, at 68. A “deed” is a written instrument by which
land is conveyed. At common law, it also means any written instrument that is
signed, sealed, and delivered and that conveys some interest in the property. Deed, 
BLACK’S LAWDICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
57. LOWE ET AL., supra note 52, at 308.
337577-LSU_EL_8-1.indd  111 1/3/20  7:23 AM
      
 
 
 
  
  
  
 
 
 
  
  
  
 
 
  
   
  
 
  
  
   
   
  
  
   
  
  
 
  
  
 
   
 
  
   
 
 
  
   
 
   
      
     
1072019] PETROLEUM, CONCESSIONS, LICENSES AND LEASES
succession, judgement liens, even though the current trend is to treat oil
and gas rights as sui generis.58 It is no wonder why both courts and parties
commonly misunderstand petroleum leases.
As mentioned above, there are also public leases in North America,
such as the lands owned by the U.S. federal and state governments and the
Crown Lands of Canada. This private-public ownership issue makes it
necessary for petroleum developers to be cognizant of differing laws and
regulations that will be at the basis of the lease depending on which
sovereign entity owns the land. This partially stems from an interesting
sovereignty problem that arose in the United States regarding which 
sovereign owned the offshore minerals. Ultimately, the United States
settled the issue by allowing the states the ability to control some portion
of offshore minerals along its coast, but after a certain distance into the
coastal waters, the Federal government owns those minerals. Therefore,
there are actually many sovereign entities that can be a party to a public
petroleum lease in the United States depending on whether the petroleum
resource lies underneath state or federally owned lands.59 Each of these 
governments will have its own form of lease that addresses the concerns
of the public and the need to develop these resources for revenue and
industry.
While no minerals are owned by private parties in offshore waters, the
same is not true for onshore development. Therefore, it is not
unforeseeable to have a private lease and public lease that cover the same
petroleum if government and private lands adjoin one another (i.e.,
unitization). In such a case, petroleum exploration and production
companies would need to be abreast of the regulations that control the
public lease along with ensuring that the private lease is enough to govern
the private parties.
II. THE LEGAL NATURE OF GRANTING INSTRUMENTS
Concession agreements, licenses, and leases are considered a 
“borderline phenomenon” between public and private law.60 In the absence
of clear international law rules or standards with general applicability to
govern them, answers concerning their legal nature need to be found in the
national laws of the host state. However, as shown above, these systems
vary greatly with respect to the way rights are granted, the applicable legal
regime, and the ownership of petroleum. Thus, for any (foreign) investor
58. Id. at 310.
59. See Submerged Lands Act 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301, 1331(a), 1332 (2012).
60. ULFBECK, supra note 31, at 32.
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and the host state, the legal nature of the granting instrument is of utmost
importance because it will define their relationship, rights, and obligations,
as well as their expectations, and therefore, any kind of comparative
analysis of granting instruments must address this issue.
A. Private Contracts, Public Contracts, or Administrative Acts?
As of now, the literature identifies three theories61 concerned with
determining the legal nature of granting instruments. According to the first
theory, granting instruments can be perceived as administrative/regulatory 
acts—such as (exclusive) licenses granted by the state that makes them
subject to unilateral change or termination if public interest so requires.
This position is largely adopted by Western developed countries such as
the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, and the United Kingdom.62 The 
second theory regards granting instruments as contracts, which confers on
them a binding character (historical Middle East concessions),63 meaning 
unilateral change or termination will entitle the aggrieved party to obtain
penalties. The third theory considers them hybrid forms—such as
administrative contracts—governed by a special set of rules addressing
and imposing limits to the pressing issue of unilateral change for public
utility64 without banning it altogether. This is the case in France, Germany,
61. Id. at 33–34. For details concerning the importance of determining
whether the license is a contract or a regulatory act, see Hammerson, supra note
7, at 62–63.
62. Terence Daintith, Contractual Discretion and Administrative Discretion:
A Unified Analysis, 69 MODERN L. REV. 555 n.4 (2005). The UK license, although
contractual in appearance, is regulatory in nature. The United Kingdom has one
of the oldest petroleum legislations in the world. The first act was implemented
in 1918, amended in 1934 and further consolidated in 1998. The chosen model to
this day is exploitation of resources based on an exclusive license from the
government (administrative permission.) DAINTITH, supra note 27, at 200.
63. DAINTITH, supra note 27, at 223. The governing legal framework of the
traditional concessions was contractual. In the absence of dedicated petroleum
legislation, the parties had to resort to the only legal instrument available: their
agreement.
64. Cristina Ionaş, The Administrative Agreement as a Legal Form for Public
Services in Comparative and Roman Law, 5 BULL. TRANSILVANIA U. BRAŞOV:
SERIES VII: SOC. SCIS. 103, 104 (2012); Adriana Magdalena Sandu & Maria Sofia
Pagarin, Study on Administrative Contracts, 4 CONTEMPORARYREADINGSL.& SOC.
JUSTICE 903, 905 (2012); see also Elena-Mihaela Fodor, Public Services and Private
Law, ACTA UNIVERSITATIS LUCIANBLAGA IURISPRUDENTIA 228–32 (2012)
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1092019] PETROLEUM, CONCESSIONS, LICENSES AND LEASES
and to a certain extent, Romania and Brazil, but also Egypt and French law
tradition Arab countries.65 
Al Qurashi and Talus take the view that the modern concessions (in
opposition to the historical ones) are “public law contracts”66 given the
fact that “they are regulatory in substance, their regulatory components
being predominant vis-à-vis the contractual elements,”67 which would
increase the political risk for foreign investors, due to the possibility that
the State could use its powers to unilaterally amend the “carefully
negotiated equilibrium.”68 Talus does not exclude the possibility that these
agreements may be administrative contracts as well with a clear reference
to the French system.69 He outright rejects the possibility that they are 
private law or international contracts, without proposing a detailed
explanation, rather stating that “[t]hey are part of the national legal and
administrative system of the host State and allow a foreign company to
invest in a country.”70 
Other views are not so straightforward. Given the lack of clarity
regarding the legal character of licenses issued under Norwegian law, a
pure distinction between private and public law rules was dismissed as
“clearly untenable.”71 A production license is a contract in the sense that
it provides evidence of an agreement between the licensee and the
government, but it is also a grant by the government subject to public
administration legislation. However, it is emphasized that regarding the
license as a contract does not necessarily mean that contract rules are
applicable. Similarly, regarding it as a public administrative act does not
necessarily exclude private law rules.72 The legal relationship is a hybrid
one (“a legal bastard in the sense that both public and private law are
applicable but to different aspects of the relationship”),73 because of which
the question of status is deemed one of terminology rather than of
substance.74 This standpoint seems to equate the license with the French
administrative contract, which would also fit Talus's divide between public
65. Zeyad A. Al Qurashi, Renegotiation of International Petroleum 
Agreements, 22 J. INT’L ARB. 261, 274 (2005); Fodor, supra note 64, at 289.
66. Al Qurashi, supra note 65, at 263; Talus, Looper & Otillar, supra note
13, at 183.
67. Al Qurashi, supra note 65, at 263 (citing Bernardini, n.7).
68. Id. at 263.
69. Talus, Looper & Otillar, supra note 13, at 183 n.12.
70. Id. at 183, 192.
71. DAINTITH, supra note 27, at 192.
72. Id. at 191.
73. Id. at 192.
74. Id. at 193.
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110 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
and administrative contracts, but it is still far from providing a fully
satisfying explanation. 
An argument similar to the one above may be made for public leases.
Like the production license, the public lease is a contract in the sense that
it provides evidence of an agreement between the licensee and the
government, but it is also a grant by the government subject to public
administration legislation. It is also arguable that the lease is more of a
legal hybrid. The express terms of the United States federal lease always
govern during the lease, as would be expected under private contract
principles. However, the rules and regulations that the leaseholder is
subject to are subject to change after the granting of the public lease.75 This
concept and the consequences will be further explored later in the paper.
The matter is more complex than it appears at first sight for the line
between private and public law is blurred in certain jurisdictions, such as
the United States and Canada. Here, the real property owner has the right
to exploit the petroleum located beneath the property.76 This weakens the
distinction between private and public ownership of petroleum (especially
for private leases).77 However, public leases might provide a closer
connection between the private and public nature of a granting instrument.
Carmen Otero García-Castrillón claims that the contractual nature of
the lease cannot be doubted and that any divide between public-
administrative and private contracts is completely irrelevant due to the fact
that concession agreements belong to a “purely international category,”
and international law does not distinguish between such categories as
national law does.78 This position is backed by three Libyan arbitration 
awards: British Petroleum Company Limited v Government of the Libyan
Arabic Republic (1979), Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company/California
Asiatic Oil Company and the Government of the Libyan Arabic Republic
(1979), and Libyan American Oil Company v Government of the Libyan
Arab Republic (1981), which built on the assumption that from an
international perspective, a concession qualified as an administrative
contract under Libyan law is always a contract.79 
75. See the language of the Form BOEM-2005, (Feb. 1, 2017); see also
Century Expl. New Orleans, LLC v. United States 110 Fed. Cl. 148, 182 (2013),
aff’d, 745 F.3d 1168 (Fed Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1175 (2015).
76. It should be kept in mind that it is possible for the mineral resource estate 
ownership to be severed and reserved from the surface estate in the United States.
77. HAMMERSON, supra note 7, at 36.
78. Carmen Otero García-Castrillón, Reflections on the Law Applicable to
International Oil Contracts, 6 J. WORLD ENERGY L. & BUS. 129, 131 (2013).
79. Id. at 131, n.7.
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Accordingly, it is difficult to determine the precise legal nature of each
granting instrument as the legal system behind such instrument might
determine if it should be a private arrangement, public contract, or a hybrid
form. Another ambiguity refers to the application of national,
international, or customary law to such arrangement, which will be
discussed in the following section.
B. National, International, or Customary Law?
From a purely doctrinal perspective, a contract between a state and a
private entity was less likely to be directly governed by international law, 
even if the private entity was a foreign one. Public international law was
commonly applied to inter-state relations80 as private parties were 
considered to lack standing under international law.81 This view is no
longer valid due to the development of international investment law.
Moreover, the “foreign element” was not significant enough to change the
national character of the granting instrument. By making an investment in
a foreign country, one submits to the national law of that specific host
state.82 Among reasons thereof, one may mention (1) that the tender
procedure is governed by national law; (2) that the granted area is part of
the territory of the host state; (3) that the legal rights deriving from the
granting instruments stem in most cases from the host state sovereign
powers; (4) that all activities are performed in the host state; (5) that many
times activities are performed through a special purpose vehicle that will
be incorporated under national law of the host state; and (6) that local laws
and standards apply with respect to tax, environment, and labor.
Nevertheless, many granting instruments refer to best industry practices,
which also involve international standards. In addition, the host granting
instrument might be affected by the indirect application of international
laws, such as the laws of the sea, environmental standards, and human
rights protections.83 
80. IVAR ALVIK, CONTRACTING WITH SOVEREIGNTY: STATE CONTRACTS
AND INTERNATIONALARBITRATION 3 (2011). See also Al Qurashi, supra note 65,
at 278.
81. ALVIK, supra note 80, at 47. The author refers here solely to legal
standing arising out of a contract. Otherwise, private entities might have rights
and obligations under international law stemming from investment treaties,
criminal acts, or in connection to observance of human rights.
82. Id. at 3.
83. For a detailed analysis of the logic that would argue for choosing the law 
of the host state, given the close links with the contract, see Otero García-
Castrillón, supra note 78, at 138–40. Nevertheless, one must mention here that a
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Despite disagreements on the international character of petroleum
agreements, most authors agree there is a process of internalization
concerning them. The main rationale refers to their purpose which is
directly related to stimulating foreign direct investments and alleviating
the worries of investors with respect to the concomitant political risk,84 by 
creating a “reliable concept of state commitment.”85 For this purpose, and
with the wide support of the arbitral practice (including both commercial
and investment arbitration), a purely national matter was extracted from
the coverage of national law and national courts and brought into the ambit
of international law and investor-state arbitration. 
There are two aspects to this phenomenon. On the one hand, it is the
intangibility of arbitral practice, achieved through the New York
Convention or the ICSID Convention,86 which essentially might “force”
national courts to recognize and enforce arbitral awards. However, such
enforcement is subject to the compatibility with their legal system
combined with the possibility that the national court might be less familiar
or with higher constraints to review such awards on their merits. These
might enable arbitral tribunals to rely less on national rules when it comes
to substantive law and conflict of laws and focus on practices and customs
of international commerce.87 On the other hand, there is a complex
construct by which a contract between a State and a private investor is
turned into a binding agreement under international law (a set of principles
granting instrument might be subjected to international law in various occasions
such as a disputed area or stemming from international environmental laws or
industry standards.
84. Talus, Looper & Otillarp, supra note 13, at 192. See also ALVIK, supra
note 80.
85. ALVIK, supra note 80, at 3.
86. See generally Convention on the Settlement of Investment, Oct. 14, 1966,
575 U.N.T.S. 159.
87. Id. at 26–27. It was emphasized that internationalization of contract could
find its limits in the imperative norms and the public order of the host state's
courts, however, this phenomenon is on the verge of disappearance, especially
since under the ICSID Convention, public order has been removed from the
reasons that could be used to challenge the enforceability of arbitral awards. See 
also Otero García-Castrillón, supra note 78, at 138. As the matters related to
international commercial arbitration exceed the purpose of this paper, they will 
not be developed upon further.
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1132019] PETROLEUM, CONCESSIONS, LICENSES AND LEASES
and practices which some refer to as lex petrolea)88 based on a direct or
indirect resolution of the parties thereof.89 
Both aspects of the legal theories on which internationalization of
petroleum agreements are based deserve more attention. The contractual
and arbitral practice on which the concept of internationalization
developed is based on the traditional concession agreements granted to
Western companies in the Middle East at the beginning of the twentieth
century and later in the 1950s or 1960s. These contracts, although set in a
local legal vacuum and grossly unfair to the host states,90 were deemed
extremely risky for the investors. In response, the contracts brought them
under the umbrella of international legal order and disconnected them 
from the legal systems of the host states, via express provisions in favor of
international arbitration and choice of international law corroborated with
stabilization clauses. Given the principles of party autonomy in
contracting and the doctrine of separability of the arbitration clause,
arbitral tribunals enjoyed competence to decide on their “own” jurisdiction
and could base their awards on international law.91 Today, the wide
adoption of the ICSID Convention facilitates resorting to international law
by providing a dispute resolution mechanism between foreign investors
and States based on the model of international commercial arbitration,
with a clear, explicit basis thereof.92 
Besides the above, arbitral practice seems to also be responsible for 
the creation of a specific legal regime meant to govern petroleum
transactions involving a cross-border element.93 This legal regime, lex 
petrolea, is a specific type of lex mercatoria, meaning a mélange of
general principles of international law and customary law applicable only
to the petroleum sector.94 Whether one agrees that a lex petrolea exists or 
not is open to debate. However, what is undeniable is that in their pursuit
for a balanced legal regime applicable to granting instruments, both the 
“parties, through contract clauses, and arbitrators, through the application
and interpretation of contract clauses, have given a considerable role to the
88. Otero García-Castrillón, supra note 78, at 138. See also Talus, Looper &
Otillar, supra note 13, at 189.
89. Otero García-Castrillón, supra note 78, at 138. See also ALVIK, supra
note 80, at 25, 30.
90. Talus, Looper & Otillar, supra note 13, at 186.
91. ALVIK, supra note 80, at 30–41.
92. Id. at 42.
93. Talus, Looper & Otillar, supra note 13, at 189.
94. Otero García-Castrillón, supra note 78, at 145.
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‘internationalization’ of the underlying legal relationship, and, therefore,
to the definitive ‘privatization’ of state contracts.”95 
Nevertheless, the petroleum sector is one of the most regulated due to
a wide variety of public interests surrounding it, including environmental
protection and national security, and most of the norms governing granting
instruments have imperative character.96 Assuming that all of the above is 
possible, and granting instruments do become somehow private, the
question is this: how does the state get downgraded from a public
international law sovereign to a mere business “partner” with limited to no
regulatory powers?
Ivar Alvik suggests that the privatization of the agreement between 
state and IOCs is achieved when “the state surrendered its sovereign
prerogatives vis-à-vis its co-contractors”97 by resorting to a contractual
mechanism designed to restrict its ability to repeal or modify a contract
via subsequent legislation, namely a stabilization clause.98 But, as Alvik
rightfully points out, this theory fails to confront the substantive issues it
addresses: can the reference to international law, general principles of law,
or other international standards “lift the contract into the sphere of
application of the principle of pacta sunt servanda to neutralize the
legislative sovereignty of the state concerned?”99 This Article would 
further ask: is the contract actually lifted from the sovereign powers of the
state into a private binding agreement, or is it actually downgraded to one?
The question is useful to reveal the legal theory created by arbitral practice
and its paradox: if the relationship between the state and the foreign
investor is a vertical one, then national law should apply, and the state can
make use of its sovereign powers to amend the granting instrument as its
public interests deem fit which might be subject to compensation and other
legal protections for investors. However, if the relationship between the
state and the foreign investor is a horizontal one, then international law
should not apply because private entities are not commonly subject of
international law.100 
A similar issue concerning the interplay between private and public
law is present in cases of expropriation for public utility. International law
does not define public purpose. What constitutes public purpose varies
95. Id. (emphasis added).
96. Id. at 146.
97. ALVIK, supra note 80, at 54.
98. Id. at 56.
99. Id.
100. Recently, however, private entities have been made subject to
international law in regard to observance of human rights and environmental
obligations.
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1152019] PETROLEUM, CONCESSIONS, LICENSES AND LEASES
from national security to social and economic reasons, all superseding
private interests. Nevertheless, the generally accepted freedom of states to
define what constitutes public interests did not preclude arbitral tribunals
from scrutinizing their decisions and verifying whether the measures were
reasonable and proportionate with the public objective pursued. The
question is: which standards should arbitral tribunals assess the necessity
of expropriation? Given that the decision of the state to expropriate is a
sovereign one and that public interest varies from one state to another, the
obvious answer is that the criteria employed by arbitrators should be those
established by the national law of the respective state. 
However, the vast majority (although not the unanimity) of arbitral
practice is of the opinion that expropriation is only justified if it is
necessary and no alternative measure is available.101 There is one arbitral
award where the arbitrator clearly stated that the justification of
expropriation should not be a matter of concern for arbitral tribunals. Thus,
in Libyan American Oil Company v Government of the Libyan Arab
Republic,102 the sole arbitrator took the view that “motives (for
nationalization) are indifferent to international law, each state being free
to judge for itself what it considers necessary for the public good . . . . The
objectives pursued by it is of no concern to third parties.”103 Although this 
view was not embraced by other awards, the arbitrator's logic is sound and
in accordance with the sovereignty of the State.
As previously noted, the legal nature of granting instruments is far
from being settled. Leases, licenses, and concessions remain difficult to
confine within the clear boundaries of national and international rules, or
within those of private or public law. The large arbitral practice developed 
does not provide a unanimous answer, however, it does underline a trend
towards internationalization of granting instruments. The legal
implications are addressed in the following Part.
III. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS STEMMING FROM THE TYPE AND LEGAL 
NATURE OF THE GRANTING INSTRUMENT
In principle, the chosen type of granting instrument is not of great
importance, what does matter for both the Host Government and the oil
and gas companies are the terms and conditions agreed upon.
Nevertheless, the granting instruments contain different implied terms,
powers, and protections for the parties involved.
101. Otero García-Castrillón, supra note 78, at 154.
102. Libyan Am. Oil Co. v. Gov’t of the Libyan Arab Republic, (Apr. 12,
1977) 20 I.L.M 1.
103. Id. at 58 (emphasis added).
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A. Similarities and Distinctions between the Granting Instruments 
At times, leases, licenses, and concessions greatly differ in the rights
granted, while at other times they are nearly identical to one another,
depending on the jurisdiction. It may be useful to think of these granting
instruments in a Venn diagram since each instrument will have both
common and distinct traits from each other.
The precise differences and similarities might vary in accordance to
the terms agreed upon and based on the national law governing the
relevant granting instrument. The table below presents the key similarities
and distinctions between them as follows:
Concession License Lease
Legal nature Hybrid, but 
mostly contract
Hybrid, but
mostly
regulatory
Hybrid, but 
mostly contract
Public or private 
law instrument
Hybrid, but 
mostly private
Hybrid, but 
mostly public
Mostly private
Legal system Commonly less
developed
Commonly more
developed
Commonly more
developed
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1172019] PETROLEUM, CONCESSIONS, LICENSES AND LEASES
Concession License Lease
Reputation Commonly in 
favor of 
investors
Commonly in 
favor of the state
Possibly neutral
Reserves 
ownership
Commonly Host 
Government
Commonly Host 
Government
Host 
Government
and/or Private
Production
ownership
Commonly 
Private
Commonly 
Private
Commonly 
Private
Exclusive rights Commonly yes Commonly yes Commonly yes
Non-Exclusive 
rights
Possible, but not 
common
Possible Possible
Registration Not common Not common Potentially
mandatory
Multiple 
granting
instruments over
different layers
of the block
Not common Not common Commonly yes
Duration Commonly 
fixed, but 
possible to
extend
Commonly 
fixed, but 
possible to
extend
Possible to keep
it until last
production
Work program Commonly fixed Commonly fixed Commonly fixed
Signature bonus Commonly yes Not common Commonly yes
Royalties Commonly yes Not common Commonly yes
Stabalization Not common
nowadays
Not common Not common
Confidentiality Commonly yes Not common Commonly yes
Different 
instruments for
exploration,
development and
production
Possible Possible Possible
The table reveals that the three granting instruments are characterized
by more commonalities than differences. The latter, however, concerns the
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legal nature of the instrument (regulatory, contractual or both), the
governing legal framework (private, public, or a mixture), and the issue of
sanctity of contract. Thus, they will constitute the focus of the following
subparts.
B. Petroleum Concession
The concession is in many regards a contract, so its benefits and
disadvantages are readily apparent when viewed through a bilateral
contractual lens. Unlike the license regime, the provisions of a concession
are generally negotiable, and in theory, easier to adjust should such a need 
arise. Historical concessions were not constrained by legislation, which 
led to more flexibility. This flexibility is crucial in areas that have not been
explored before or which might pose potential unforeseeable challenges to 
the relevant stakeholders.104 Should an issue arise, it can be dealt with far
quicker than by changing legislation and with fewer risks than by
administrative intervention (unilateral modification). Additionally, being
able to negotiate the provisions allows the concession to reflect the
realities of where this type of agreement is commonly seen. This is where
a concession can be particularly valuable since the concession can be used
to supplement legal gaps in petroleum resource development, or even a
complete lack thereof.
Nevertheless, there can be challenges when using a concession as a
granting instrument. First, reliance on a negotiable contract (concession)
as the primary instrument granting and defining rights leads to less reliance
on the laws of the host nation, even though this no longer tends to be the
case in modern concessions.105 Second, concessions were poorly 
negotiated in the past from the perspective of the governments granting
these instruments due to lack of bargaining power and experience,106 
employment of bribes, lack of or inadequate framework, international
pressure in the form of military intervention, and economic embargo.
While most Host Governments have gained back the bargaining power,
they still face the risk of just being unskilled negotiators in granting the
104. Haufler, supra note 4, at 58.
105. Nicholas Miranda, Concession Agreements: From Private Contract to
Public Policy, 117 YALE L.J. 510, 539 (2007). As an example, Miranda refers to
the case where an oil and gas concession, although not prohibiting the state to
pursue alternative energy sources, may end up dissuading the government from
pursuing such options. Id.
106. Petroleum investments are large and highly specific in nature, requiring a
great deal or resources and specialized experience which the host state might not
possess (emphasis added).
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concession. Poorly negotiated concessions can leave the government short
of its resource development goals.107 While a petroleum company may not
think that this affects them, an optically poor concession could place the
government in a difficult spot politically and might encourage future
renegotiation.108 
Furthermore, negotiations can lead to concessions with varying
provisions. This is more of a challenge for the government rather than the
oil and gas company. The varying provisions require more government
resources to be used for oversight and administration, one consequence of
this being a more difficult implementation of the concession.109 
Three characteristics worth addressing are discretion, confidentiality,
and the stabilization and sanctity of contracts. The first—discretion—is 
concerned with the fact that a very small group of people might be 
deciding the provisions of the concession, behind closed doors, as opposed
to a legislative body, where the concession system could be developed in
a wider public forum and could be subjected to parliamentary approval.
When only a small group of individuals takes part in decision-making, 
the risk of corruption and short-term prioritization at the expense of future
generations110 undoubtedly increases and may result in failure to generate
optimal levels of revenues.111 This is not what companies or governments 
desire in today’s business environment especially in light of the United
States’ Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the United Kingdom’s Anti-
Bribery Act, expanding criminal liability of companies to actions
performed in foreign countries.
107. Both parties of an oil and gas concession stand to profit when a 
commercial discovery is exploited. However, some companies engage in
exploration operations to diversify their resource pool and are not interested in
commercial exploitation right away. Market prices may also act as a deterrent to
commercial exploitation. However, such business decisions affect the state
revenues and expectation for return from the discovery made.
108. Where concession holders fail to recoup investment or to make a profit
on the investment due to market conditions, they usually push for changes in the
concession's terms—modification of revenues, taxes, and prices, thus asking for
state's support. The alternative is a disruption in provided services, which would
require a retender and a replacement of concessionaire. This would not be in the
interest of the state or of the stakeholders. As such, renegotiations are often a
“necessary evil” in ensuring the continuation of the economic viability of a
project. Miranda, supra note 105, at 525–26.
109. FED. MINISTRY FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., NATURAL RESOURCE
CONTRACTS AS A TOOL FORMANAGING THE MINING SECTOR 12 (2015).
110. Haufler, supra note 4, at 58.
111. Miranda, supra note 105, at 521.
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Confidentiality is another key factor. Considering that natural
resources tend to be public ones, the government might have a competing 
interest in the confidentiality of a concession. The government might
desire to keep the terms of each concession secret to not lose bargaining
power in future negotiations with oil and gas companies, but they must
also consider the public’s interest in knowing the provisions of the
concession since governments derive legitimacy from the public
opinion.112 
The position of oil and gas companies varies depending on whether
they have already obtained the granting instrument. If they have a granting
instrument, then they might have an interest in keeping the provisions
confidential. However, if they do not have one, their interest is, at least
initially, in knowing how far the government will negotiate. Today, many
governments are more transparent and readily publish these agreements
on a government website or through a third party, such as The Extractive
Industries Transparency Initiative.113 
Finally, stabilization based on the principle of sanctity of contract
(pacta sunt servanda) is of particular importance to oil and gas companies
negotiating with governments. In principle, concessions could secure a
stabilization provision in a mutually binding arrangement. Stabilization is
one of the first arguments raised if the government tried to change
unilaterally the provisions of the concession. In the same vein, the
government could make the same argument when the company inevitably
requests changes in the concession, although this possibility rarely occurs
in practice.
C. Petroleum License
As previously discussed, a license derives from the legislation of the
host nation, consequently making the legislation the primary instrument
that governs the parties’ relationship. There are several benefits stemming
from this. First, a legislatively defined license decreases opportunities for
corruption for both the sovereign and the oil and gas company. Terms and
provisions that stray from the legal norm—if not prohibited already—will 
undoubtedly require a logical explanation, therefore disincentivizing bad
actors. Secondly, because the legislation and regulations that surround the
112. FED. MINISTRY FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., supra note 109, at 25.
113. “The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) is the global
standard to promote the open and accountable management of oil, gas and mineral
resources.” (Emphasis added). EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES TRANSPARENCY
INITIATIVE, https://eiti.org/explore-data-portal [https://perma.cc/8A4M-4Y5X]
(last visited on Aug. 15, 2019).
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license are normally public information, there is more public oversight of
the licensing process and its provisions.114 Therefore, both parties should
be more conscious of the optics of the rights granted by a license.
To tie both benefits together, licenses need to be administered by a
governmental body. This body will have to act within the limits of the
legislation leading to a greater “security of tenure”115 for the oil and gas
companies. This helps oil and gas companies feel more comfortable in
investing their own capital along with securing any outside capital to
extract the petroleum resources to the extent such government does not
abuse its powers.
With consistent terms and conditions, the governmental authority has
a lighter burden with respect to oversight of multiple licenses in effect at
any given time. Supervision and control are centralized and strengthened,
experience increases, while management costs are reduced, all converging
to increase efficiency. This is simply because it is easier to administer
uniform provisions than a variety of provisions found in multiple
agreements, which is the case in different concession agreements.116 
Licensing regimes also have downsides for both parties. The same
reason that governments and oil and gas companies benefit from a
licensing regime—legislation—can also lead to difficulties. For example,
because most of the provisions derive from legislation, there is little room
for flexibility. From a government perspective, this can lead to it being
unable to respond quickly and adequately to changing economic,
technological, and market conditions. Conversely, oil and gas companies
could also be constrained by not receiving the more flexible provisions
when necessary (if applicable). This leads to another disadvantage of
licensing regime: the reliance on legislative action. It is common that
legislators might be slow in enacting legislation. This can cause a host
nation to fall behind in legal developments and better legal practices in the
face of advancing technology and global practices. This type of issue can
be contracted around in concessions and leases as long as it is not contrary
to existing laws.
114. COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT & INT’L COUNCIL ON MINING &
METALS, MINERAL TAXATION REGIMES 9 (2009).
115. This refers to the operator knowing: “(1) he has sufficient time to carry out
exploration and/or mining operations; (2) after discovering a deposit, he also has a 
virtual automatic right to mine what he has discovered; and (3) there are clear and
objective cancellation procedures of one’s concessions.” See Chaim Even-Zohar, 
Upstream Mining Risks: Security of Tenure, IDEX (Jan. 3, 2008), http://www.
idexonline.com/FullArticle?Id=29230 [https://perma.cc/L3DB-3EAR].
116. FED. MINISTRY FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV, supra note 109.
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These challenges are inherent to the license regime, notwithstanding
whether the system was well-built or not. To implement a license, the host
nation must spend significant time and political effort building a
comprehensive and comprehensible regime, something with which it may
have little experience. This may constitute the reason why licenses are
common in developed countries—the United Kingdom, Norway, and
Denmark. As mentioned above, the law does not operate in a vacuum;
political, economic, and technological changes are constant. This
necessitates the updating of laws by the legislature, and the consequences 
of failure to do so can lead to some of the disadvantages discussed.
Lastly, even if the legislature timely makes updates to the petroleum-
licensing regime, there is difficulty in applying laws already in effect to
the licenses, even though it might be possible to do so without any 
previous compensation. On one hand, if there is no retroactive effect, the
administration of such licenses becomes more burdensome and the impact
of legislation might be minimum, as it will not touch upon licenses in
force. On the other hand, if it is retroactive, license holders are forced to
accept different conditions than originally agreed, which might affect the
investment and its profitability, leading to potential disputes as retroactive 
legislative changes are similar in effect to unilateral changes in a contract
of adhesion. These are all aspects that license holders should contemplate.
D. Petroleum Lease
Petroleum leases are quite peculiar as they often refer to private
ownership, which is less likely to exist in a concession or license regime.
In this way, it is possible to suggest that a petroleum lease is closer to a
petroleum concession due to its contractual nature. This is particularly true
for private petroleum leases as compared to public leases, which are 
crucial to the United States offshore petroleum development. The public
nature that affects a petroleum concession does not affect a private
petroleum lease. However, a public lease does have a public nature in the 
United States, thus resembling a license agreement in several ways.
A private petroleum lease could have the most flexible terms among
all granting instruments due to its private nature. Unlike other
jurisdictions, this is partially the reason why onshore shale gas managed
to grow quickly in the United States. The lease provides both private 
ownership and flexibility to adjust contractual terms to an extent
acceptable to all parties. However, such type of agreements might be less
transparent and possibly with less involvement of public policies and
procedures in comparison to the other granting instruments.
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In addition, the fact that a private petroleum lease is called a “lease”
can bear consequences and lead to confusion. To tackle them, well-drafted 
statutes will provide that the petroleum lease is not included in the scope
of the regulation or statute because of the previous difficulty with equating
the common lease with the petroleum lease.
As mentioned, not all petroleum leases involve private individuals.
Both private and public leases are subject to statutes and regulations.
However, unlike a private lease, under a public lease not only are basic
contractual principles applicable, but also voluminous laws and
regulations on how the government will interact with the private lessee
now and in the future are applicable. Further, the public lease subjects the
private lessee to less stability for any issues other than those expressly
stated in the lease as illustrated below.
The largest landowner is the United States. The United States Bureau
of Land Management (BLM), oversees 248.3 million acres of public land
and administers about 700 million acres of federal subsurface mineral
estate throughout the nation.117 Considering the government is
representing people who hold a variety of opinions, the public leasing
process must balance environmental concerns and safety concerns against
the billions of dollars that is generated by production of oil and gas on
these public lands. The United States government does this with a
surprisingly short petroleum lease.
The BOEM Gulf of Mexico Oil and Gas Lease is only four pages long.
This indicates that there are matters that are not expressly written in the
lease itself but are provided by law. The United States federal
government’s oil and gas lease is very much like the ones between private
parties in principle and its core function except that it incorporates the
regulations “promulgated pursuant thereto, and other statutes and
regulations in existence upon the effective date of a federal lease, and those
statutes enacted and regulations promulgated thereafter.”118 The lease 
form is clear that only explicit terms of the lease are not subject to change.
Importantly for the government, this language and its effects on the parties 
was held to be valid prospectively and retrospectively in Century 
Exploration New Orleans, LLC v. United States,119 a post Deepwater
Horizon case where Century Exploration New Orleans sought to challenge
the new oil spill bond amounts required by the Department of Energy
being applied to existing leaseholders. It is through this incorporation of
117. CAROL HARDY VINCENT ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL42346,
FEDERAL LAND OWNERSHIP AND DATA (2017) (this is noted in the Summary).
118. Form BOEM-2005 (Feb. 1, 2017).
119. 110 Fed. Cl. 148, 182 (2013), aff’d, 745 F.3d 1168 (Fed Cir. 2014), cert.
den’d, 135 S. Ct. 1175 (2015).
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statutes and regulations that the four-page lease can govern some of the 
most complicated and expensive drilling operations in the world.120 
However, just because the government can incorporate future changes
to the law and regulations in a lease that was previously granted does not
mean the government is free to ignore its obligations to a private lessee. In
Mobil Oil Exploration,121 the E&P companies successfully argued the
repudiation of their lease by the government and therefore were entitled to
their fees paid to the government when the government refused to grant
the permits necessary to conduct their exploration and production
activities off the North Carolina coast.
A public lease also goes through a somewhat complex process in being
awarded to oil and gas developers. In this way, the granting instrument
looks very similar to the license and concession. For example, the United
States government requires an environmental statement before a notice of
proposed sale to the public and before it enters the bidding system.122 The 
legislation allows for these bids to be in the form of cash payments,
royalties, or a combination.
It should be noted that in public leases one refers to “legislation
allows” because it is through the legislation that administrative bodies
derive their power to make leasing decisions. While there is freedom to
make decisions as an administrative agency, such an agency must be
careful to stay within those granted powers or face judicial scrutiny from 
the leasing party or members of the public in general. This constraint on
the administrative party is not something that is seen on private parties.
While there are clearly laws that regulate the private oil and gas lease,
these laws are more in line with public order and resource management
concerns. Therefore, because there is considerably more freedom to
contract, the private lease will contain sections and clauses to deal with a
plethora of possibilities that are not necessary or desired by the
government considering those same possibilities will be addressed by laws
and regulations.
Simply stated, unlike a private lease, the public lease is governed by 
basic contractual principles combined with a large body of laws and
regulations that mold how the parties interact with one another at the time
of rights granting and after granting the public lease. In this sense, a private
120. Dana E. Dupre, What Makes the United States Offshore Leasing System 
So Special? A Primer on the Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Lease, 4 LSU
J. ENERGY L. & RESOURCES 37 (2015).
121. See Mobil Oil Expl. & Producing Southeast, Inc. v. United States, 530 
U.S. 604 (2000).
122. JOSEPH TOMAIN & HON. RICHARD CUDAHY, ENERGY LAW IN A
NUTSHELL 257 (West Academic, 2nd ed., 2011).
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lease is closer to a petroleum concession and a public lease is closer to a
petroleum license.
CONCLUSION
Concessions, licenses, and leases are commonly used throughout
different regions around the world. All these instruments suit different
jurisdictions, but the precise terms and conditions, their legal nature, and
the public-private law divide, impact the host nation and the oil and gas
company’s rights, obligations, and expectations. By resorting to a
comparative analysis of the three granting instruments, this Article offered 
a systematic and integrated view of their similarities, their distinctions, and
the concomitant consequences.
One cannot deny that, at their core, these granting instruments tend to
be similar: (1) they have the same scope, allowing investors to own the
resources they produce; (2) they have a hybrid legal nature to a certain
extent; and (3) modern ones tend to be mostly present in developed
countries.
Nevertheless, their distinctions are not without relevance. Petroleum
concessions tend to possess a private nature, similar to private leases,
while petroleum licenses tend to possess a public nature similar to public
leases. Petroleum concessions, as well as private leases, tend to be 
confidential, while petroleum licenses tend to be non-confidential like
public leases. Petroleum concessions tend to provide stability for the
agreed terms, as do private leases, while petroleum licenses and public
leases tend to offer less. Lastly, petroleum licenses tend to require a 
relevant legal system to support such granting instrument, while petroleum
concessions and petroleum leases do not bear such requirement.
Additionally, it is relevant to note that historical concession
agreements differed far more from licenses and leases in comparison with
modern concessions. However, the concession might still suffer from the
stigma of its past colonial ties or its harsh terms in favor of the investors.
For this reason, Host Governments limit its use. Nevertheless, as this
Article pointed out, the precise terms and conditions, and certain implied
conditions, of each regime influence the development of oil and gas
resources, making them slower or faster, respectively, and either more
consistent or more adaptable, as the case might be.
